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WHEN IT COMES TO PARENTS,  
THREE’S NO LONGER A CROWD:  
CALIFORNIA’S ANSWER TO IN RE M.C. 
Jason de Jesus* 
          The California Legislature recently amended the 
California Family Code by granting courts the authority 
and discretion to find that a child can have more than two 
parents. This Article addresses the issues raised by this 
amendment, focusing on the rare instances in which 
rejecting a third parent's claim for custody would be 
detrimental to the child. By exploring public perceptions of 
multiple parentage and assessing recent cases highlighting 
the discretion courts use to find that a child has more than 
two parents, this Article concludes that recognizing that a 
child has more than two parents can protect not only the 
rights and benefits of children, but also their emotional, 
psychological, and financial needs.  
 
 ∗ J.D., May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
How many parents does it take to raise a child? According to 
proverbial wisdom, it takes a whole village. This Article seeks to 
address the issues surrounding the California Legislature’s decision 
to allow more than two parents into the proverbial village. 
Ordinarily, a child has only two parents; however, the American 
family structure has evolved such that a child can have more than 
two parental figures. Consider a situation in which a child, M.C., is 
born during the marriage of Melissa and Irene, but conceived as a 
result of a premarital relationship between Melissa and Jesus, the 
biological father. Alternatively, consider a situation in which M.C. is 
conceived with the help of a sperm or ova donor who establishes a 
parent-like relationship with M.C. In either situation, California 
courts would presume that Melissa and Irene are M.C.’s parents. 
If M.C. is taken into protective custody as a result of Melissa’s 
involvement in the stabbing of Irene, should the court place M.C. 
into foster care or should it recognize Jesus as a third legal parent?1 
If Jesus helped raise M.C. with Melissa and Irene, would failure to 
recognize Jesus’ parental rights be detrimental to M.C.? 
In light of these situations, the California Legislature amended 
the Family Code,2 granting courts the authority and discretion to find 
that M.C. has more than two parents.3 To do so, courts must consider 
all relevant factors and find that “recognizing only two parents would 
be detrimental to the child.”4 
Since the adoption of the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), 
California has expressly recognized that establishing parentage, the 
legal recognition of a parent-child relationship, is vital to children: 
There is a compelling state interest in establishing 
[parentage] for all children. Establishing [parentage] is the 
first step toward a child support award, which, in turn, 
provides children with equal rights and access to benefits, 
including, but not limited to, social security, health 
insurance, survivors’ benefits, military benefits, and 
inheritance rights. Knowledge of family medical history is 
 
 1. Facts based on In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 2. Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references in this Article are to California 
statutes. 
 3. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7601(c), 7612(c) (West 2013). 
 4. Id. § 7612(c). 
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often necessary for correct medical diagnosis and treatment. 
Additionally, knowing one’s [parent] is important to a 
child’s development.5 
Similarly, establishing parentage is vital to parents since the law 
accords them the fundamental right “to make decisions concerning 
the care, custody, and control of their children.”6 
The UPA governs the determination of parentage, as well as 
custody, visitation, and child support, and establishes the following 
key ideas: (1) parentage confers parental rights, privileges, duties, 
and obligations;7 (2) biological relationship to a child is not always 
sufficient to establish parentage;8 and (3) a person can establish 
parentage by qualifying as a “presumed parent,” pursuant to a series 
of rebuttable parental presumptions listed in Family Code sections 
7611 and 7612.9 
Historically, courts interpreted these presumptions to limit a 
child to a maximum of two parents.10 This interpretation comported 
with the traditional family unit, consisting of a husband and wife, 
and their biological children. Additionally, courts applied the two-
parent limitation to adoption cases, where the biological parents’ 
legal relationship with a child must be terminated and replaced by 
that of the adoptive parent.11 
However, significant societal changes since the adoption of the 
UPA necessitated the legal recognition of multiple parentage—that a 
child can have more than two parents. First, medical and 
technological advances compelled courts to recognize non-traditional 
presumptions of parentage. In response to genetic testing improving 
the courts’ ability to determine biological paternity, courts 
interpreted the UPA to protect the bond between a child and a father, 
usually the mother’s husband, who later discovered that he was not 
 
 5. Id. § 7570(a). Likewise, the Legislature has recognized the public’s interest in “a simple 
system allowing for the establishment of voluntary paternity” since it would increase the ease of 
establishing paternity, increase the number of children who have greater access to child support 
and public benefits, and decrease the amount of court resources required to determine paternity. 
Id. § 7570(b). 
 6. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000). 
 7. FAM. § 7601. 
 8. In re Nicholas H., 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002); see FAM. § 7612(a), (d). 
 9. FAM. §§ 7611, 7612; see infra Part III. 
 10. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 870 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 11. Sharon S. v. Super. Ct., 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003).  
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biologically related to the child.12 Additionally, since assisted 
reproductive technology allows mothers to share a biological link 
with children born via gestational surrogate, courts granted parental 
rights to persons who intended to raise children resulting from 
surrogacy agreements.13 Because technological advances have 
expanded the definition of a parent, legal recognition of multiple 
parentage is essential to preserve the parental rights of those newly 
defined parents. 
Second, in 2005, the California Supreme Court acknowledged 
the parental rights of same-sex couples.14 In determining same-sex 
parentage, the court focused on the couples’ intent to raise a child 
and whether each partner qualified as a presumed parent under the 
UPA.15 The court recognized “the value of having two parents, rather 
than one, as a source of both emotional and financial support, 
especially when the obligation to support the child would otherwise 
fall to the public.”16 Although the courts continued to prohibit 
children from having more than two parents, the policy factors 
discussed in the same-sex parentage cases similarly justify the legal 
recognition of more than two parents. 
Lastly, the American family structure has evolved to include 
more than two parents in situations involving stepfamilies, assisted 
reproduction, adoption, and foster care. Consequently, courts faced 
an increasing number of cases in which more than two individuals 
sought to establish parentage status over the same child. Although 
some cases presented situations where recognizing more than two 
legal parents was necessary to protect a child’s best interests, the 
courts instead limited their decision to only two parents. As a case in 
point, the In re M.C.17 court agreed that limiting a child to two 
parents was unfair in light of changing social views; however, the 
court expressed that it was the Legislature’s responsibility, not the 
court’s, to make such significant policy determinations.18 
 
 12. Craig L. v. Sandy S., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606, 610–11 (Ct. App. 2004); Steven W. v. 
Matthew S., 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 538 (Ct. App. 1995); see FAM. §§ 7540, 7611(a). 
 13. Johnson v. Calvert, P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993). 
 14. See Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005); Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 117 P.3d 690 
(Cal. 2005); K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 690 (Cal. 2005). 
 15. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 669. 
 16. Id. 
 17. 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 2011). 
 18. S.M. v. E.C., No. F065817, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 4574, at *14 (Ct. App. June 27, 
2014). 
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Consequently, the California Legislature amended the Family 
Code, granting courts the authority and discretion to find that a child 
can have more than two parents.19 To do so, courts must consider all 
relevant factors and find that “recognizing only two parents would be 
detrimental to the child.”20 By approving Senate Bill 274 (“S.B. 
274”), the Legislature recognized that parent-child relationships can 
include more than two parents, and it appreciated the legal and 
emotional protections that those relationships inherently provide. 
Moreover, S.B. 274 serves the best interest of children and provides 
children with vital rights and benefits that they had been unfairly 
denied. 
This Article addresses the issues regarding California’s 
amendment of its Family Code, and focuses on the rare instances 
when rejecting a claim of a third parent for custody or visitation 
would be detrimental to the child. 
Part II discusses the necessity of S.B. 274 and summarizes the 
amendments to the Family Code. Part III analyzes the UPA 
presumptions of parenthood, addressing who may bring an action for 
parentage and how courts resolve conflicting claims of parentage. 
Part IV takes a closer look at In re M.C., the California case to which 
the Legislature responded by enacting S.B. 274, the so-called “three 
parent rule.”21 Part V explores public perceptions of multiple 
parentage, particularly the oppositions’ arguments and the 
supporters’ responses. Part VI critically assesses recent cases 
highlighting the broad discretion courts use in finding that a child has 
more than two parents. Lastly, Part VII concludes that allowing more 
than two parents into California’s proverbial village not only protects 
the rights and benefits of children like M.C., but also their emotional, 
psychological, and financial needs. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In California, both the family courts and the juvenile 
dependency courts have the authority to determine parentage and to 
legally recognize a parent-child relationship and the specific rights a 
 
 19. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7601(c), 7612(c) (West 2013). 
 20. Id. § 7612(c). 
 21. S.B. 274, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856 (Ct. App. 
2011). The California Supreme Court held that under the Uniform Parentage Act, adopted by 
California as part of its Family Code, a child can only have two legal parents. 
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parent has over a child.22 In determining parentage, both courts issue 
orders pursuant to the UPA.23 
In family courts, plaintiffs can bring actions against a parent to 
determine the existence of a parent and child relationship, child 
support, custody, visitation, and adoption according to what is in the 
“best interest of the child.”24 Additionally, plaintiffs can request 
orders for custody, visitation, or child support as part of a case that 
establishes the child’s parentage.25 
Dependency courts, on the other hand, decide cases regarding 
the safety and protection of children who have been or are at risk of 
serious physical, emotional, or sexual harm.26 At dependency court 
hearings, a juvenile court may find that a child is a “dependent child 
of the court,” thereby assuming jurisdiction over the child, if the 
child has suffered serious harm or is at substantial risk for suffering 
serious harm by the child’s parents or guardians.27 Once a petition 
has been filed to declare a child a dependent, the juvenile court has 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear an action filed under the Family Code 
to determine parentage pursuant to the UPA.28 
Additionally, dependency courts may issue orders to limit a 
parent’s control over a dependent child.29 If the court finds that 
returning a child to the parent would be detrimental, the court may 
select one of three permanency plans in order of the following 
preference: (1) terminate the rights of the parents and place the child 
for adoption; (2) appoint a relative as legal guardian; or (3) order that 
the child be placed in long-term foster care.30 Since juvenile court 
findings significantly impact a parent-child relationship, designation 
 
 22. FAM. §§ 7630, 7500 et. seq.; CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 245.5 (West 2008); CAL. R. 
CT. 5.635 (West 2013). 
 23. FAM. §§ 7600–7730; WELF. & INST. §§ 316.2, 726.4; CAL. R. CT. 5.635. 
 24. See generally CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7630-50, 7660-71 (West 2014) (stating that “the 
judgment or order may contain any other provision directed against the appropriate party to the 
proceeding, concerning the duty of support, the custody and guardianship of the child, visitation 
privileges with the child, the furnishing of bond or other security for the payment of the 
judgment, or any other matter in the best interest of the child.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. WELF. & INST. § 300. 
 27. Id. 
 28. WELF. & INST. §§ 316.2, 726.4; CAL. R. CT. 5.635. 
 29. WELF. & INST. § 361. 
 30. WELF. & INST. § 366.26. As an exception, the court may find that termination of parental 
rights would be detrimental to the child if “the parent has regular visitation and contact with the 
child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” WELF. & INST. 
§ 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i) (West 2014). 
 
786 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:779 
as a presumed parent is essential because it entitles the parent to 
appointed counsel, custody absent a finding of detriment, and a 
reunification plan.31 
A.  Senate Bill 274 Was Necessary 
Prior to S.B. 274, California courts interpreted the UPA to 
prohibit children from having more than two legal parents.32 The 
two-parent limitation became problematic once family structures 
expanded beyond the traditional family unit, making it less 
uncommon for families to consist of more than two parents. 
Situations involving more than two parents usually occur in 
cases involving a biological mother, a biological father, and a 
presumed parent who treated the child as his or her own.33 
Additionally, the situation also occurs in cases involving gestational 
surrogates or sperm donors who remain in the resulting child’s life.34 
In re M.C. exemplifies the rare situation, prior to S.B. 274, in 
which California law detrimentally limited the recognition of 
parental rights to only two parents. Despite finding that M.C. had 
three presumed parents, the court remanded the matter to the juvenile 
court to resolve the competing parental presumptions in accordance 
with the Family Code at the time.35 The California Court of Appeal 
held that, pursuant to the UPA, a child cannot have more than two 
parents.36 Fortunately, California Senator Mark Leno introduced S.B. 
274 on February 14, 2013, to abrogate the In re M.C. decision.37 
Prior to the enactment of S.B. 274, children, like M.C., 
completely lost access to persons they relied on as their parents since 
California did not provide visitation rights to non-parents.38 Forcing 
 
 31. In re Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 708 (Ct. App. 2003); see WELF. & INST. 
§§ 317(a), 361.2(a), 361.5(a). 
 32. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 877 (Ct. App. 2011); Scott v. Super. Ct., 89 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 843, 847 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 33. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 856; Scott, 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 845–46; Amy G. v. M.W., 
47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 309 (Ct. App. 2006). 
 34. Johnson v. Calvert, P.2d 776, 781–82 (1993). 
 35. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. at 877. At the time of the case, California courts resolved 
conflicting parental claims by applying Family Code section 7612(b) to determine which parental 
presumption is weightier in consideration of policy and logic. 
 36. Id. at 877. 
 37. S.B. 274, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 856. 
 38. Should a Court Be Permitted to Find That a Child Has More Than Two Legal Parents: 
Hearing on S.B. 274 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) 
[hereinafter Hearing on S.B. 274]. 
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M.C. to separate from a third parent could potentially cause 
devastating psychological, emotional, and financial consequences.39 
Furthermore, the law forced third parents to relinquish substantial 
rights including custody and visitation,40 services and earnings of the 
child,41 access to school and medical records,42 the right to determine 
the child’s residence and education,43 and the right to authorize 
medical care.44 
Undoubtedly, S.B. 274 serves childrens’ best interest by 
recognizing parent-child relationships that include more than two 
parents and appreciating the legal and emotional protections that 
those relationships provide.45 Moreover, legal recognition of 
multiple parentage provides the child with vital rights, including the 
right to financial support from all parents; access to health insurance, 
benefits, and inheritance; and more placement options as an 
alternative to foster care.46 
B.  Summary of Existing Law (Post-S.B. 274) 
On October 4, 2013, California Governor Jerry Brown signed 
S.B. 274 into law. S.B. 274 granted courts the authority to find that a 
child can have more than two legal parents.47 In enacting the bill, the 
Legislature declared that courts must have the power to protect 
children from the devastating psychological and emotional harms 
that result from separating a child from a parent.48 S.B. 274 amended 
Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c), to provide: 
In an appropriate action, a court may find that more than 
two persons with a claim to parentage under this division 
are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two 
parents would be detrimental to the child. In determining 
detriment to the child, the court shall consider all relevant 
 
 39. See In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 877; Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38. 
 40. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (West 2004). 
 41. Id. § 7500. 
 42. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51101 (West 2008); FAM. § 3025 (West 2014). 
 43. See EDUC. § 51101; FAM. § 7501 (West 2013). 
 44. See FAM. § 6910 (West 2014). 
 45. Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38; Governor Signs Bill Protecting Children Who Have 
More Than Two Legal Parents, NCLR (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.nclrights.org/press-room/press-
release/governor-signs-bill-protecting-children-who-have-more-than-two-legal-parents/. 
 46. NCLR, supra note 45. 
 47. S.B. 274, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., §§ 1, 6 (Cal. 2013). 
 48. Id. § 1. 
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factors, including, but not limited to, the harm of removing 
the child from a stable placement with a parent who has 
fulfilled the child’s physical needs and the child’s 
psychological needs for care and affection, and who has 
assumed that role for a substantial period of time.49 
Contrary to the opposition’s view, S.B. 274 did not redefine the 
presumptions and standards for determining parenthood.50 Rather, 
the bill merely provided courts with a statutory basis on which to 
recognize families with more than two parents. Accordingly, S.B. 
274 required that any source of law regarding the rights, protections, 
benefits, responsibilities, obligations, and duties of parents, “shall be 
interpreted to apply to every parent of a child where that child has 
been found to have more than two parents . . . .”51 
For example, S.B. 274 amended Family Code section 3040 by 
requiring courts to allocate custody and visitation to more than two 
parents based on the existing “best interest of the child” standard.52 
However, the bill did not require a court to grant all parents legal or 
physical custody of the child if it found that it would not be in the 
best interest of the child considering the factors in Family Code 
sections 3011 and 3020.53 When applying the best-interest-of-the-
child standard, the court must “address the child’s need for 
continuity and stability by preserving established patterns of care and 
emotional bonds.”54 
Similarly, S.B. 274 added Family Code section 4052.5, 
requiring courts to apply the existing statewide uniform guideline 
when dividing child support obligations among more than two 
parents.55 The current statewide uniform guideline requires courts to 
 
 49. Id. § 6; see FAM. § 7612(c). 
 50. Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38. In order for a court to recognize legal parentage for 
more than two persons of a single child, the court must still find that each person is a presumed 
parent under the Family Code. 
 51. FAM. § 7601(d) (West 2013). 
 52. S.B. 274, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., § 2 (Cal. 2013); see FAM. § 3040(a)(West 2004 & 
Supp. 2015). 
 53. FAM. §§ 3040(d), 3011, 3020 (West 2004 & Supp. 2015) (providing a court shall 
consider the health, safety, and welfare of the child, the history of abuse of any of the parents, the 
nature and amount of contact with the child, any habitual and continued use of alcohol or 
controlled substances, and the frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents 
have ended their relationship or dissolved their marriage). 
 54. Id. § 3040(d). 
 55. S.B. 274, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., § 3 (Cal. 2013); see FAM. § 4052.5(a) (West Supp. 
2015). 
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divide child support obligations based on each parent’s income and 
the amount of time each parent spends with the child.56 Moreover, if 
applying the statewide uniform guideline is unjust and inappropriate, 
the court can divide child support obligations in a just and 
appropriate manner.57 
Lastly, S.B. 274 codified the holding in Sharon S. v. Superior 
Court58 by allowing for second parent and third parent adoptions.59 
This provision, conditioned upon the consent of all parents involved, 
allows adopted children to maintain the emotional, psychological, 
and financial bonds with their biological parents that traditionally 
were terminated upon adoption. 
III.  UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT PRESUMPTIONS OF PARENTHOOD 
The UPA defines the parent and child relationship as “the legal 
relationship existing between a child and the child’s natural or 
adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, 
privileges, duties, and obligations.”60 
The UPA provides the statutory framework by which California 
courts determine legal parentage. Under this statutory scheme, 
California law distinguishes “alleged,” “biological,” and “presumed” 
parents.61 An “alleged” parent is a person claiming to be the parent 
of a child, but whose biological relationship to the child has not been 
established, or, in the alternative, has not achieved presumed parent 
status.62 A “biological” parent is one who has established a 
biological relationship with the child, but has not achieved presumed 
parent status.63 
“Presumed” parents are accorded far greater parental rights than 
alleged or biological parents.64 To qualify as a presumed parent, an 
 
 56. FAM. § 4052.5(a). 
 57. Id. §§ 4052.5(b), 4057(b)(5)(D). 
 58. S.B. 274, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 
(Cal. 2003). 
 59. FAM. § 8617(b) (West 2013); Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 570. 
 60. FAM. § 7601(b). 
 61. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. For example, in a dependency hearing, the need to establish a “presumed” parent 
status is pivotal; it determines the extent to which the person may participate in the proceedings 
and the rights to which he or she is entitled. Only “presumed” parents are entitled to receive 
reunification services and custody of the child. Id. (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 361.2, 
361.5(West 2008 & Supp. 2015)). 
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alleged parent must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
the foundational facts supporting his or her entitlement to presumed 
parent status.65 Once an alleged parent establishes this foundation, 
clear and convincing evidence is required to rebut the statutory 
presumption.66 
A.  UPA Presumptions of Parenthood 
Presumed parent status is governed by sections 7540 and 7611 
of the Family Code, which enumerates several rebuttable 
presumptions under which a person may qualify for this status.67 
Depending on the type of presumption an alleged parent seeks, the 
court may require the alleged parent to file the action within a limited 
amount of time. 
Generally, courts base the presumed parent status on the familial 
relationship between the person and the child, rather than any 
biological connection.68 “The [parenthood] presumptions are driven, 
not by biological [parenthood], but by the state’s interest in the 
welfare of the child and the integrity of the family.”69 
The Family Code provides a “conclusive presumption” of 
parenthood to a husband living with the child’s mother during 
conception.70 Codified in section 7540, the conclusive presumption 
provides that “the child of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who 
is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of 
the marriage.” 71 If a child is conceived by a married woman who 
cohabited with her husband at the time of the child’s conception, the 
husband’s conclusive presumption can outweigh the rights of an 
alleged biological father.72 On the other hand, if a husband did not 
cohabit with his wife during conception, and the child is biologically 
related to another father, the husband cannot claim a “conclusive 
presumption” under section 7540.73 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (referring to FAM. § 7612(a)). 
 67. FAM. §§ 7540, 7611. 
 68. See In re J.L., 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 32 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 69. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 20 (Cal. 2004) (quoting In re Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
705, 708 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
 70. FAM. §§ 7540. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Giovanna F., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460 (Ct. App. 1992). 
 73. In re Danny M., No. A138844 & A140256, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 3943, at *27 (June 3, 
2014). For example, although the husband in In re Danny M. cohabited with his wife during the 
birth of the child and held the child out as his own natural child, he did not qualify under the 
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Additionally, section 7611 sets forth a series of rebuttable 
presumptions, applied gender neutrally, under which an alleged 
parent may qualify as a presumed parent.74 Persons who qualify 
under the 7611 presumptions of parentage can bring an action at any 
time to declare the existence of a parent and child relationship and to 
establish presumed parent status.75 
The qualifications pursuant to section 7611, subdivisions (a) 
through (c), focus specifically on the marital relationship between the 
presumed parent and the child’s natural mother.76 Under 7611, 
subdivision (a), alleged parents may qualify as presumed parents if 
they were married to the child’s natural mother during the time of 
birth.77 Subdivisions (b) and (c) qualify an alleged parent if he or she 
attempted to marry the child’s natural mother any time before or 
after the child’s birth.78 
Subdivision (d) focuses specifically on the relationship between 
the alleged parent and the child.79 An alleged parent may qualify as a 
presumed parent under subdivision (d), if he or she “receive[d] the 
child into his or her home and openly [held] out the child as his or 
her natural child.”80 The presumed parent must “receive the child 
into the home substantially enough to signify assumption of parental 
responsibility for the child.”81 
 
section 7540 “conclusive presumption” since he did not cohabit with his wife during the time of 
conception. 
 74. FAM. § 7611. Although the section 7611 presumptions lacked gender-neutral language 
prior to amendment in 2013, courts have determined that the presumptions must be applied 
gender neutrally. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 664–65 (Cal. 2005) (finding 
that the paternity presumptions in the Family Code must be applied equally to mothers). 
 75. FAM. § 7630 (West 2013 & Supp. 2015). Interested parties that qualify under section 
7630(a) include the following: (1) the child; (2) the child’s natural parent; (3) an adoption agency; 
(4) a prospective parent; (5) an “alleged” parent, or a parent who was married to or attempted to 
marry the child’s “natural mother” within 300 days of the child’s birth; (6) persons who received 
the child into their own home and openly held out the child as their natural child; and (7) a party 
to an assisted reproduction agreement. Alternatively, persons who seek to declare the 
nonexistence of a parent and child relationship, particularly those who do not want legal authority 
or obligation over the child, must bring an action “within a reasonable time after obtaining 
knowledge of relevant facts.” 
 76. Id. § 7611(a)–(c). 
 77. Id. § 7611(a). Alleged parents may also qualify under subdivision (a) if the child was 
born within 300 days after the marriage was terminated by death, annulment, declaration of 
invalidity, divorce, or separation. 
 78. Id. § 7611(b)–(c). 
 79. Id. § 7611(d). 
 80. Id. 
 81. In re Danny M., No. A138844 & A140256, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 3943, at *36–37 
(June 3, 2014). 
 
792 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:779 
B.  Which Presumption Is Greater? 
Courts do not automatically prefer one presumption over 
another.82 Instead, courts must guide their determinations by the core 
considerations of “the integrity of the family and protection of the 
child’s well-being.”83 
To resolve conflicting parentage claims, courts apply Family 
Code section 7612 on a case-by-case basis, assessing “the existence 
and nature of the social relationship between a putative [parent] and 
child.” 84 Unless the court determines that a child has more than two 
parents, if two or more presumptions conflict, the court must conduct 
a fact-based analysis, considering policy and logic.85 Furthermore, 
the 7612 analysis provides that the 7611 presumptions of parenthood 
“may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and 
convincing evidence.”86 
The court does not automatically prefer a person who is 
biologically related to a child, but must weigh all relevant factors in 
determining the presumed parents.87 Parenthood “presumptions are 
driven, not by biological paternity, but by the state’s interest in the 
welfare of the child and the integrity of the family.”88 
For example, the court in Steven W. v. Matthew S.89 recognized 
that “[a] man who has lived with a child, treating it as his son or 
daughter, has developed a relationship with the child that should not 
be lightly dissolved” and that the “relationship is much more 
important, to the child at least, than a biological relationship of actual 
paternity . . . .”90 Similarly, the California Supreme Court held in In 
 
 82. Craig L. v. Sandy S., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606, 613 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 83. In re Danny M., 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 3943, at *41 (citing Neil S. v. Mary L., 131 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 51, 57 (Ct. App. 2011)); see Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1234 (Cal. 1992); 
see also Craig L. v. Sandy S., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606, 614 (Ct. App. 2004) (“In resolving such a 
conflict, the trial court must at all times be guided by the principle that the goal of our [parentage] 
statuses is ‘the protection of the child’s well-being.’”) 
 84. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612 (West 2013); In re Danny M., 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 3943, at 
*41 (citing Neil S., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 57). 
 85. FAM. § 7612(b). 
 86. Id. § 7612(a). 
 87. Id.; In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 13 (Cal. 2004). Proving a lack of a biological relationship 
to a child does not automatically qualify as the “clear and convincing evidence” required to rebut 
the presumptions of parenthood. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 667 (Cal. 2005) 
(noting that a natural parent within the meaning of the UPA could be a person with no biological 
connection to the child.)  
 88. In re Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 708 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 89. 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 535, 539 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 90. Id. at 539. 
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re Nicholas H.91 that even though the man claiming paternity was not 
biologically related to the child, it was not an appropriate action to 
rebut the presumption of parenthood because it would have 
otherwise produced a harsh result of leaving the child fatherless.92 
Likewise, courts do not automatically prefer the presumption of 
a spousal relationship under 7611, subdivision (a).93 In Craig L. v. 
Sandy S.,94 the court noted that “a per se rule, which would require 
termination of an existing paternal relationship in favor of preserving 
any marriage, without regard to the harm the child might suffer, is at 
direct odds with the entire statutory framework governing paternity 
actions.”95 
In addition to a presumption of parenthood under subdivision 
(d), a biological father may qualify as a Kelsey S.96 father and 
possess a federal constitutional right to due process that “prohibits 
the termination of his parental relationship absent a showing of his 
unfitness as a parent.”97 Generally, a Kelsey S. father is an unwed 
biological father who “has sufficiently and timely demonstrated a 
full commitment to his parental responsibilities” but has been 
precluded from attaining presumed father status by the mother or a 
third party.98 In such a situation, the biological father’s “federal 
constitutional right to due process prohibits the termination of his 
parental relationship absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent.”99 
Lastly, Family Code section 3020(a) requires courts to 
determine the best interest of the child and whether recognizing the 
alleged presumptions of parenthood would be detrimental to the 
child.100 Section 3020(a) expressly declares that “the perpetration of 
child abuse or domestic violence in a household where a child 
 
 91. 46 P.3d 932 (Cal. 2002). 
 92. Id. at 933–34. 
 93. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d at 13; Craig L. v. Sandy S., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606, 612–15 (Ct. 
App. 2004). 
 94. 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 95. Id. at 613. 
 96. 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992). 
 97. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal. 1992). 
 98. Id. at 1237; see In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 868 (Ct. App. 2011), In re Elijah V., 
25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 99. Adoption of Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236 (Cal. 1992). The Kelsey S. court reasoned 
that “the child’s well-being is presumptively best served by continuation of the father’s parental 
relationship.” Id. 
 100. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(a) (West 2004). 
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resides is detrimental to the child.”101 
IV.  A CLOSER LOOK AT IN RE M.C. 
The California Legislature enacted S.B. 274, the so called “three 
parent rule,” as a direct response to In re M.C.102 In that case, the 
California Court of Appeal reversed a juvenile court’s finding that a 
child, M.C., had three presumed parents, and held that, under the 
UPA, M.C. can only have two legal parents.103 The issue decided 
was whether a child born during the marriage of two women, but 
conceived as the result of a premarital relationship, may have three 
legal parents: a biological mother, the mother’s wife, and the 
biological father who promptly came forward and demonstrated his 
commitment to his parental responsibilities.104 
A.  The Facts 
M.C.’s childhood experience is tragic and far from typical. She 
was born into Melissa and Irene’s violent and volatile relationship.105 
Although the couple did not fight during the pregnancy or in front of 
M.C., they often engaged in physical violence.106 M.C.’s biological 
mother, Melissa, suffered from bipolar disorder and severe 
depression, and on several occasions she had been involuntarily 
hospitalized due to suicidal ideations.107 Additionally, Melissa had a 
significant history of drug abuse and continued to regularly drink and 
smoke marijuana.108 
In February 2008, Melissa and Irene became registered domestic 
partners, but they separated on May 25, 2008.109 In June 2008, 
Melissa began an intimate relationship with Jesus and became 
pregnant with M.C.110 During the first few months of the pregnancy, 
Melissa lived with Jesus and his family, and Jesus provided financial 
support and ensured Melissa received prenatal medical care.111 
 
 101. Id.; see In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 15-16 (Cal. 2004). 
 102. 564 S.B. 274 (Cal. 2013); see In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 856. 
 103. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 878. 
 104. Id. at 867. 
 105. Id. at 862–63. 
 106. Id. at 863–64. In May 2009, Irene pushed Melissa into a closet and a window. Id. at 864. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 861. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
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In July 2008, Melissa filed a petition to dissolve the domestic 
partnership and sought a temporary restraining order against Irene 
based on allegations of abuse and physical violence.112 However, in 
September 2008, Melissa left Jesus without providing any contact 
information, reconciled with Irene, and married Irene a month 
later.113 
Melissa gave birth to M.C. in March 2009 with Irene present.114 
Although M.C. was initially given the surname Melissa shared with 
Irene, Melissa was the only parent listed on M.C.’s birth 
certificate.115 
Unfortunately, it was only three to four weeks until Melissa 
moved out, taking M.C. with her.116 In May 2009, Irene filed a 
request for an order seeking joint legal and physical custody of 
M.C.117 Melissa opposed the request and obtained a restraining 
order, which required Irene to refrain from contacting M.C.118 The 
restraining order was replaced in July 2009 by a court order granting 
Irene weekly monitored visitation.119 
In June 2009, Melissa contacted Jesus, who had moved to 
Oklahoma to pursue a job opportunity, telling him that she left Irene 
and needed financial assistance for M.C.120 Jesus agreed and 
regularly sent money.121 Melissa and Jesus maintained contact, and 
Melissa regularly took M.C. to visit Jesus’s family.122 
In September 2009, the Los Angeles County Department of 
Children and Family Services (DCFS) took M.C. into protective 
custody after Melissa’s new boyfriend, Jose, stabbed Irene with a 
knife in both her neck and back, leaving her in critical condition.123 
“Melissa was arrested and charged as an accessory to attempted 
murder” for her involvement in the attack.124 Initially, Melissa 
denied any involvement in the stabbing; but a recorded telephone call 
 
 112. Id. at 861–62. 
 113. Id. at 862. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 862 n.3. 
 120. Id. at 862. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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revealed that Melissa planned for Jose to attack Irene.125 Moreover, 
Melissa admitted that she and Jose routinely used drugs in front of 
M.C. and smoked methamphetamines in the car with M.C. in the 
backseat.126  
B.  The Juvenile Court Recognizes Three Parents 
The dependency court asserted jurisdiction over M.C. and 
placed her in shelter care.127 In its reasoning, the court acknowledged 
Melissa and Irene’s history of domestic violence, Melissa’s 
incarceration, and Melissa’s history of substance abuse.128 
Unsurprisingly, DCFS hesitated to place M.C. in Irene’s care. 129 
In addition to Irene’s injury and the possibility of being attacked by 
Jose, who remained at large, Irene could not provide suitable living 
conditions.130 Among other things, Irene was unemployed, received 
general relief and food stamps, lacked transportation, and lived in a 
two-bedroom apartment with neither beds nor a refrigerator.131 
After its investigation, DCFS recommended that the juvenile 
court find Jesus to be M.C.’s presumed father and order M.C.’s 
placement with Jesus in Oklahoma.132 Jesus told DCFS that he 
always intended to be M.C.’s father regardless of his relationship 
with Melissa.133 Jesus was willing to do whatever necessary to have 
M.C. released to his care.134 Although Jesus did not pay child 
support or assert visitation and custody of M.C. after her birth, Jesus 
regularly sent funds to care for her.135 Additionally, Jesus was 
employed at a grocery store as an assistant produce manager, he had 
stable and adequate housing, and both his fiancée and M.C.’s 
grandmother could help care for M.C.136 
The juvenile court ultimately found that M.C. had three parents: 
Melissa—M.C.’s biological mother—and both Jesus and Irene—
 
 125. Id. at 863. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 862. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 864. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 863–64. 
 132. Id. at 865. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 866. 
 135. Id. at 865. 
 136. Id. 
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M.C.’s presumed parents.137 The juvenile court declared M.C. a 
dependent of the court, placed M.C. in the care of her maternal 
grandparents, and ordered reunification services for Jesus, Irene, and 
Melissa.138 The court granted Jesus unmonitored visitation and 
overnight visits and ordered DCFS to determine whether Jesus’s 
Oklahoma home was suitable for M.C.139 The court also granted 
Irene and Melissa monitored visits.140  
C.  The Court of Appeal’s Two-Parent Decision 
On appeal, M.C. and the amici curiae argued that the juvenile 
court’s finding of three parents should be affirmed.141 On the other 
hand, Melissa and Irene insisted that the juvenile court erred in 
finding Jesus to be M.C.’s presumed father.142 Additionally, although 
Jesus did not dispute Melissa or Irene’s claim to parentage, he argued 
that the court erred when it refused to place M.C. in his custody.143 
The Court of Appeal agreed with M.C. and the amici curiae that 
the UPA was “ill equipped” to accommodate the evolving family 
structure and “novel parenting relationships.”144 At the time, if two 
or more claims for presumed parent status conflicted, the UPA 
required courts to resolve the conflicting claims by applying a fact-
based analysis and to limit its determination to a maximum of two 
parents.145 
However, the court declared that recognizing three parents 
would involve complex and important policy determinations that 
were best left to the Legislature.146 The court reasoned that it was 
bound to the California Supreme Court’s rejection of the concept of 
three parents.147 On several occasions, the California Supreme Court 
had concluded that a child may only have one presumed father and 
one natural mother.148 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 866. 
 139. Id. at 866–67. 
 140. Id. at 866. 
 141. Id. at 867. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 869–70. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. at 870. 
 147. Id. at 870. 
 148. Id.; see Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005); In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 
11 (Cal. 2004) (although more than one individual may fulfill the statutory qualifications that 
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Additionally, the In re M.C. court stated that it would be 
inappropriate to find that M.C. has three parents since she never had 
safety or stability with any of the parents.149 First, Melissa was never 
capable of providing M.C. with a stable home: she suffered from 
significant mental illness, and she had a lengthy history of drug and 
alcohol abuse.150 Second, the court questioned whether Irene could 
pull her own life together enough to be considered a suitable 
caretaker.151 Irene had significant domestic violence issues and 
lacked appropriate housing, parenting skills, employment, and 
transportation.152 Lastly, although Jesus appeared to be the most 
stable and capable parent available, he had not attempted to establish 
a parent-child bond prior to the dependency proceeding.153 
On the merits, the court found that both Melissa and Irene were 
undisputedly M.C.’s presumed mothers.154 Melissa qualified as 
M.C.’s biological or natural mother pursuant to section 7610 of the 
Family Code since she gave birth to M.C.155 Irene qualified as a 
presumed mother under both section 7611 subdivision (a), the 
marital presumption, and subdivision (d), since Irene received M.C. 
into her home and openly held out M.C. as her own child.156 
Additionally, the court concluded that Jesus was a quasi-
presumptive father.157 Although Jesus could not qualify as a 
presumed father under section 7611 subdivision (d) since he never 
physically received M.C. into his home, Jesus satisfied the 
requirements of a Kelsey S. father.158 Jesus held himself out as 
M.C.’s father as soon as he learned Melissa was pregnant, and he 
acknowledged paternity to Melissa, his fiancée, and his family.159 
 
gives rise to a presumption of parenthood, there can be only one presumed father); Johnson v. 
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) (“[F]or any child, California law recognizes only one 
natural mother, despite advances in reproductive technology rendering a different outcome 
biologically possible.”). 
 149. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 870. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 870–71. 
 153. Id. at 871. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 872. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 872–73, 875. To satisfy the Kelsey S. requirements, a child’s biological father must 
prove that he promptly stepped forward and demonstrated a willingness to assume full parental 
responsibilities, but was thwarted by the mother or a third party. Id. at 875. 
 159. Id. at 875. 
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Additionally, Melissa prevented Jesus from establishing his 
presumed father status when she left him without providing any 
contact information.160 Furthermore, when Melissa contacted Jesus 
in June 2009, he promptly provided support for M.C. and maintained 
communication.161 
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court’s 
three parent decision and remanded the case to resolve the 
conflicting parentage presumptions pursuant to section 7612.162 
Section 7612 provides that certain presumptions of parenthood may 
be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.163 But because the 
court found no clear and convincing evidence that any of the three 
potential parents were unfit to retain their parental status, it 
concluded that the juvenile court must apply the section 7612 
analysis to resolve the conflicting parental claims.164 
Unfortunately, the court’s decision prolonged M.C.’s separation 
from her biological father. M.C.’s tragic ordeal illustrated the need to 
amend the antiquated Family Code to expand the number of parents 
a child can have, particularly in situations in which it would be 
detrimental to the child to recognize only two parents. 
V.  PUBLIC PERCEPTION 
In its early stages, the three-parent concept was met with great 
criticism. S.B. 274 critics argued that the three-parent law may result 
in unintended consequences, that S.B. 274 was unnecessary because 
the pre-existing law already provided alternatives to recognizing 
three parents, that recognizing three parents would destroy the 
traditional family unit, and that S.B. 274 ultimately harms the 
children.165 
S.B. 274 authors and advocates responded by explaining that the 
bill was necessary to protect the rights and benefits of both children 
and parents in limited situations. Additionally, the authors clarified 
that the bill did not significantly alter the law since it required courts 
to apply the pre-existing law to situations involving three parents.166 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 878. 
 163. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612 (West 2013). 
 164. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 877. 
 165. Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38. 
 166. S.B. 274, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. § 1(d) (Cal. 2013). 
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A.  Hard Cases Make Bad Law: The Opponents’ Arguments 
Prior to approving S.B. 274, Governor Brown vetoed an earlier 
version of the “three-parent Bill,” Senate Bill 1476 (“S.B. 1476”),167 
and urged more study of the bill’s possible ramifications.168 Brown 
commented, “I am sympathetic to the author’s interest in protecting 
children. But I am troubled by the fact that some family law 
specialists believe the bill’s ambiguities may have unintended 
consequences.”169 
As Brown mentioned, family law specialists including the 
Capitol Resource Institute (CRI) and the Association of Family and 
Conciliation Courts (AFCC) argued that the consequences of the 
“three parent law” are far-reaching and tragic.170 The CRI wrote, 
“[S.B. 274] does not thoughtfully consider the numerous areas of law 
affected by such a redefinition of parenthood.”171 For example, the 
CRI argued that S.B. 274 would “obfuscate child custody and 
support proceedings in an already overburdened court system.”172 
Additionally, the AFCC predicted that the under-resourced family 
court system could not handle the increase in litigation if family law 
attorneys advise stepparents and grandparents to seek parental 
status.173 
The AFCC simply did not see the necessity of S.B. 274 since the 
existing law at the time provided alternatives to recognizing three 
parents. The AFCC recognized that grandparent and stepparent 
visitation statutes already allowed non-parents to maintain their 
relationship with the child or even have custody regardless of the 
parents’ objection.174 Furthermore, other critics claimed that “[i]f 
both biological parents are neglectful or otherwise out of the picture, 
a judge should award custody to grandparents or other natural 
relatives, not create a ‘third parent’ out of thin air.”175 
 
 167. S.B. 1476 would have given judges authority to recognize multiple parents if doing so is 
“required in the best interest of the child.” S.B. 1476, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). In 
contrast, S.B. 274 grants courts the authority to recognize multiple parents if it would be 
detrimental to the child to only recognize two parents. 
 168. Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. 
 171. Hearing on S.B. 274 Before the Senate Rules Comm., 2013-2014 Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Letter from Diane Wasznicky, Legislation Comm. Chair, AFCC Cal., to Senator Leno, 
Cal. Senator (Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.afcc-ca.org/pdfs/AFCC_SB_274.pdf. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Randy Thomasson, Jerry Brown Blows Up the Natural Family, SAVECALIFORNIA.COM 
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Others argued that the bill would destroy the traditional family 
unit, ultimately harming the children.176 President of Save 
California.com, Randy Thomasson, similarly argued that the word 
“parent” lost its unique legal meaning, “SB 274 blows up the family 
unit by redefining ‘natural parent’ to mean ‘a nonadoptive 
parent . . . whether biologically related to the child or not.’ Governor 
Brown is contributing to the demise of family stability.”177 
The opposition claimed that recognizing three or more parents 
without establishing an upper limit is detrimental to the best interest 
of children.178 Randy Thomasson reported, “If three legal parents are 
OK, why not four or five or six legal parents? Can you imagine the 
conflicts this sets up in civil court, family court, probate court, and 
other arenas of battle?”179 Others argued that children should not 
have to worry about having their time divided among three or more 
parents who cannot agree on how to raise the child.180 They feared 
that children would “be pulled in every direction, their loyalties 
challenged and their sense of morality further corrupted and 
confused.”181  
Moreover, the AFCC disagreed with the S.B. 274 sponsors’ 
premise that the claims for multiple parentage would be rare and 
almost exclusively used by the LGBT community.182 They argued 
that heterosexual stepparents and grandparents would primarily use 
the bill, and that more adults would qualify as presumed parents by 
conforming their behavior to the requirements.183 
Lastly, Rush Limbaugh, among others, misguidedly viewed S.B. 
274 through the lens of the debate on legalizing same-sex marriage. 
Limbaugh proclaimed, “So marriage is now gonna [sic] be not a 
 
(Oct. 4, 2013), http://savecalifornia.com/10-4-13-jerry-brown-blows-up-the-natural-family.html. 
 176. Blog writer Jim Daly wrote, “with attempts to redefine God’s design of the family, when 
radicals win, it’s the children who ultimately lose.” Jim Daly, One Consequence of Gay 
Marriage, DALY FOCUS (Sept. 13, 2012), http://jimdaly.focusonthefamily.com/one-consequence-
of-same-sex-marriage/. 
 177. Thomasson, supra note 175. Thomasson believed, “the vast bulk of social science 
evidence demonstrates that children’s health, education, and behavior are better in traditional 
father-mother households.” Id. 
 178. Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38. The AFFC stated, “there is nothing in the statute 
which would prohibit the courts from allowing more than three ‘parents’ for a child . . . .” 
 179. Thomasson, supra note 175. 
 180. Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38. 
 181. Daly, supra note 176. 
 182. Letter from Diane Wasznicky, supra note 173. 
 183. Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38. 
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union of a man and a woman. It’s going to be between two men, two 
women. Well, since we’re changing the definition of marriage, what 
is to prevent three people from getting married? . . . What if 
somebody wants to marry their pet dog?”184 
B.  Response to Criticism 
In response, the authors and sponsors of S.B. 274 highlighted 
the necessity of the bill and worked to clarify the bill’s language and 
limit any ambiguities. Additionally, the authors provided guidance to 
apply the pre-existing law to situations in which a court finds that a 
child has more than two parents.185  
1.  Necessity 
Prior to the enactment of S.B. 274, courts interpreted the UPA to 
prohibit a child from having more than two parents.186 When more 
than two people claimed a right to parentage, courts had no choice 
but to determine which two parents would remain in the child’s life. 
This lack of discretion affected families frequently consisting of a 
child’s biological mother, a biological father, and a presumed third 
parent.187 Additionally, families involving the use of assisted 
reproduction, adoption, and foster care were similarly affected.  
Since California does not provide visitation rights to non-parents 
except under extremely limited circumstances,188 children were 
completely losing access to presumed third parents without the 
 
 184. Rush Limbaugh, Bill to Allow for More Than Two Parents, RUSH LIMBAUGH SHOW  
(Jul. 2, 2012), http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/daily/2012/07/02/bill_to_allow_for_more_than_ 
two_parents. However, Leno and CAI continue to be clear that the bill does nothing to change the 
definition of a parent, but rather seeks only to help judges rule in the best interest of children 
should they be in a situation in which life’s circumstances have provided them with more than 
two individuals who love and care for them as a parent. 
 185. The revised bill provided that “all of the rights and responsibilities of parentage arising 
under state law, administrative regulations, court rules, government policies, common law, and 
any other provision or source of existing law apply equally to every legal parent where a child is 
found to have more than two parents.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 7601(c) (West 2013); S.B. 274, 2013–
2014 Reg. Sess. § 1(d) (Cal. 2013). 
 186. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 870 (Ct. App. 2011); Elisa B. v. Super. Ct., 117 P.3d 
660, 666 (Cal. 2005); In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 11 (Cal. 2004) (although more than one 
individual may fulfill the statutory qualifications that gives rise to a presumption of parenthood, 
there can be only one presumed father); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) 
(“[F]or any child, California law recognizes only one natural mother, despite advances in 
reproductive technology rendering a different outcome biologically possible.”). 
 187. In re M.C., 123 Cal Rptr. 3d at 869. 
 188. FAM. §§ 3101–3104. 
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courts having any recourse.189 California law forced parents to 
relinquish their substantial parental rights and forced the child to 
separate from a loved one he or she had always considered a parent, 
potentially causing psychological, emotional, and financial 
consequences.190 By modifying the law to accommodate for more 
than two parents, California joined other states in preventing such 
devastating harms to the child.191 
Proponents argued that S.B. 274 served childrens’ best interest 
by recognizing parent-child relationships that include more than two 
parents and appreciating the legal and emotional protections that 
those relationships can provide.192 Additionally, legal recognition of 
multiple parentage provides the child with vital rights, including the 
right to financial support from all parents; access to health insurance, 
benefits, and inheritance; and more placement options as an 
alternative to foster care.193  
2.  Addressing the Upper Limit 
The authors expressly provided guidance in S.B. 274 to address 
the bill’s lack of a maximum number of parents a child may have. 
First, S.B. 274 declares the clear legislative intent “that this Bill will 
only apply in the rare case where a child truly has more than two 
parents, and a finding that a child has more than two parents is 
necessary to protect the child from the detriment of being separated 
from one of his or her parents.”194 This legislative intent statement 
guides courts only to apply S.B. 274, under the detriment standard, to 
 
 189. Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38. 
 190. Id. 
 191. In 2007, a Pennsylvania court ruled that a biological mother, her same-sex partner, and 
the sperm donor who had been involved as a parent since infancy all had an obligation to support 
a child and were entitled to at least partial custody of the child. Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 
473, 473 (Pa. 2007). A Maine court found that, in addition to two biological parents, a child may 
have a non-biological, de facto parent with parental rights and responsibilities. C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 
845 A.2d 1146, 1149–51 (Me. 2004). Delaware’s de facto parent statute, which came about in 
response to a case in which a lesbian woman was denied joint custody of a child that only her 
partner had adopted, authorizes a court to find three or more parents of a child. DEL. CODE. ANN. 
tit. 13, § 8-201 (West 2014). Similarly, the District of Columbia recognizes that a de facto parent 
has the same rights and responsibilities of parents. D.C. CODE § 16-831.01 (2013). Louisiana has 
recognized the concept of dual paternity, thus giving parental responsibilities to three parents: the 
mother, the presumed father based on marriage, and the biological father. See Smith v. Cole, 553 
So. 2d 847, 854–55 (La. 1989). 
 192. Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38. 
 193. Id. 
 194. S.B. 274, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. § 1(d) (Cal. 2013). 
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the rare number of cases involving more than two presumed parents. 
Second, S.B. 274 was written to be even more limiting than its 
previously vetoed predecessor, S.B. 1476.195 In addition to the 
presumed parent requirements, S.B. 1476 would have authorized a 
court to find more than two parents if “required to serve the best 
interests of the child.”196 S.B. 1476’s best interest standards and 
determinations were based on the presumed parent’s actions and the 
quality of the presumed parents’ relationship with the child. In 
determining a child’s best interest under S.B. 1476, “a court shall 
consider the nature, duration, and quality of the presumed or claimed 
parents’ relationships with the child and the benefit or detriment to 
the child of continuing those relationships.”197 
In contrast, S.B. 274 went beyond the best interest of the child 
standard by requiring courts to find that recognizing only two parents 
would be “detrimental to the child.”198 In determining the detriment, 
courts are required to “consider all relevant factors, including the 
harm of removing the child from a stable placement with a parent 
who has fulfilled the child’s physical and psychological needs for a 
substantial period of time.”199 The detriment standard focuses on the 
child’s needs, specifically the need to prevent the harm that would 
result from rejecting a third parent’s claim for parentage. Absent a 
finding of detriment by a court, children will continue to have no 
more than two parents. S.B.274 Bill puts the interest of the child 
above all else by relying on the detriment standard.200 
Moreover, the proponents reiterated that the number of cases 
affected by S.B. 274 is extremely limited since the bill did not 
change the pre-existing law as to who may qualify as a presumed 
parent.201 To be found a parent under S.B. 274, a person must still 
qualify under the existing UPA presumptions of parenthood. Most 
stepparents and grandparents will not qualify as presumed parents 
simply because they do not hold the child out to the world as their 
own son or daughter.202 Simply stated, the bill “will never, under any 
 
 195. S.B. 1476, 2012–2013 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. S.B. 274, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. § 6 (Cal. 2013). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
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circumstances, mean that a child automatically has more than two 
parents.”203 
3.  Applying the Existing Guidelines for Custody,  
Visitation, and Support 
S.B. 274 did not significantly alter the court’s parental 
determination analysis since the pre-existing law already provided 
guidance on resolving paternity conflicts. Essentially, the bill only 
provided the flexibility for courts to determine in their analysis, that 
a child has more than two parents if the child would suffer detriment 
if the court failed to recognize a third parent.  
Under pre-existing law, Family Code section 7612, subsection 
(b), provided that if two or more presumptions of parenthood 
conflict, “the presumption which on the facts is founded on the 
weightier considerations of policy and logic controls.”204 Courts 
applied this section 7612 analysis to determine which presumption of 
parenthood prevailed. S.B. 274 did not limit that analysis; rather, it 
provided courts the flexibility to find more than two parents.205  
S.B. 274 tightened provisions and provided guidance to courts in 
awarding custody, visitation, and support in the event that the court 
has found that a child has more than two parents.206 In regard to 
allocating custody and visitation, S.B. 274 requires courts to apply 
the same rule that they apply in custody disputes between only two 
parents.207 In cases involving only two parents, although there is a 
statutory presumption for joint custody if both parents agree to it and 
if it is in the best interest of the child,208 the courts can, and often do, 
award legal and physical custody to one parent while awarding 
visitation rights to the other. However, when applying this rule to 
situations involving three parents, courts are not required to allocate 
custody to all parents.209 For example, the court may allocate custody 
 
 203. Deborah H. Wald, SB 274: The Law and Multi-Parent Families, 36 FAM. L. NEWS 28, 
29 (2014). 
 204. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(b) (West 2014). 
 205. Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Specifically, the bill added Family Code section 3040, subdivision (d), requiring courts 
to “allocate custody and visitation among the parents based on the best interest of the child, 
including, but not limited to, addressing the child’s need for continuity and stability by preserving 
established patterns of care and emotional bonds.” Id.; see FAM. § 3040(d) (West 2004). 
 208. FAM. § 3080. 
 209. Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(d) (West 2004). 
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to two parents and restrict the third parent to only visitation rights if 
it would be in the best interest of the child. 
In regard to determining child support, S.B. 274 provides courts 
the guidance and flexibility in rare cases to depart from the state 
child support guidelines.210 The bill still requires courts to complete 
a guideline calculation for each parent prior to departing from the 
state child support guidelines.211 While this may be more 
cumbersome, the guideline complies with federal requirements.212 
Additionally, the authors of S.B. 274 anticipated that cases with 
more than two parents will be extremely rare and very fact 
specific.213 Therefore, the child support agencies will not be 
particularly burdened. 
Lastly, S.B. 274 only had a minor effect on costs. Since there 
will only be a handful of cases where courts will find a child has 
more than two parents, the California Department of Child Support 
Services did not need to reprogram the statewide support system or 
make any changes to the uniform guidelines.214 
As evidence of the S.B. 274 sponsors’ success in addressing the 
issues raised by the opposition, the bill passed through the Assembly, 
and, most importantly, Governor Brown signed the bill into law. 
VI.  THE AFTERMATH: WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE? 
Since S.B. 274 became law, the California Courts of Appeal 
have decided at least two cases involving a child who could have 
more than two parents.215 The following two cases demonstrate the 
court’s discretion to determine whether a child may have more than 
two parents.  
 
 210. S.B. 274, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess. § 3 (Cal. 2013). 
 211. Hearing on S.B. 274, supra note 38 (“[T]he guideline can be run in a multi-step process 
that involves first calculating all parents’ net income, then running the guideline program with the 
high earner as one parent and the income and time share of remaining parents combined as the 
other parent in the program. The process is then repeated for the remaining parents (with the 
highest earner excluded), with the highest earner of that smaller group listed as the high earner 
and the parents remaining as the other parent (with time shares adjusted appropriately).”). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. Additionally, the child support agencies already deal with complex family structures 
so any financial and resource costs would be insignificant. Likewise, courts would only see minor 
costs resulting from a minute increase in court time relating to allocating custody and determining 
child support obligations. 
 215. See S.M. v. E.C., No. F065817, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 4574, at *4 (June 27, 2014); In re 
Danny M., No. A138844 & A140256, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 3943 (June 3, 2014). 
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In S.M. v. E.C.,216 the court granted a limited remand for the trial 
court to determine whether a sperm donor who held out the child as 
his own natural child could be considered a third parent. Even though 
the parties did not suggest on appeal that the child may have more 
than two legal parents,217 the court nonetheless concluded that the 
matter was an appropriate case to determine whether finding only 
two parents would be detrimental to the child.218 
In contrast, the In re Danny M.219 court did not consider 
granting a remand to determine whether the child had more than two 
parents. The biological father and the husband of the biological 
mother sought recognition of presumed father status.220 The Court of 
Appeal noted its authority to find that a child may have more than 
two parents;221 however, the court weighed the competing 
presumptions pursuant to the 7612 analysis and affirmed the trial 
court’s decision that the biological father was the child’s sole 
presumed father.222 
A.  S.M. v. E.C. 
In S.M. v. E.C., a lesbian couple in a registered domestic 
partnership, E.C. and Y.M., paid a sperm donor, S.M., to provide 
sperm for conception. During the time the couple tried to conceive, 
E.C. and S.M. had a secret romantic relationship, and it was 
undetermined whether the child was born as a result of sperm 
supplied under the artificial insemination agreement or the sexual 
relationship.223 E.C. and Y.M. separated six months after the birth of 
the child.224 Shortly thereafter, S.M. moved in with E.C., and S.M. 
held out the minor as his own natural child.225 Y.M. filed a petition 
for custody and support.226 E.C. filed a petition for dissolution of the 
domestic partnership and named the minor as a child of the 
relationship.227 
 
 216. No. F065817, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 4574 (Ct. App. June 27, 2014). 
 217. Id. at *26–27. 
 218. Id. at *29. 
 219. In re Danny M., No. A138844 & A140256, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 3943 (June 3, 2014). 
 220. Id. at *1. 
 221. Id. at *24 n 7. 
 222. Id. at *40–41. 
 223. S.M., 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 4574, at *1–3. 
 224. Id. at *3. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at *4. 
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The trial court found that in addition to E.C., both Y.M. and 
S.M. were presumed parents.228 The trial court believed it would be 
in the child’s best interest to maintain a relationship with all three 
presumed parents; however, the existing legal authority at the time 
prohibited a child from having more than two parents.229 
Accordingly, the trial court was required to resolve Y.M. and S.M.’s 
competing claims by applying the fact-based analysis pursuant to 
section 7612, subdivision (b).230 
In its analysis, the court struggled to find a weightier factor that 
tipped the scales.231 Both S.M. and Y.M. had nearly evenly matched 
legal positions.232 S.M. was the child’s biological parent, but he was 
not present at the child’s birth and did not declare any parental 
interest until months after the child was born.233 Equally, Y.M. was 
not a biological parent, but assisted during pregnancy.234 
Initially, the court established the “ongoing stability of the 
family unit”235 as the determining factor, which weighed in favor of 
designating S.M. as the child’s second parent.236 The court 
tentatively ruled that S.M. was the second parent, settling on the fact 
that E.C. and S.M. were in a committed relationship and it would be 
in the best interest of the child to be raised in an intact family.237 
However, the court reconsidered its tentative ruling and 
determined that the “commitment to the child” was the determining 
factor.238 The court found that Y.M. was the second parent because 
her commitment to the child exceeded the commitment of S.M.239 In 
contrast to Y.M.’s complete commitment to parent the child since 
conception, S.M. began his sexual relationship with E.C. and 
 
 228. Id. at *16–18. First, the biological mother was automatically presumed a parent since she 
gave birth to the child. Second, the former registered domestic partner was presumed to be a 
parent under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (a), since registered domestic partners are 
legally entitled to all the rights and benefits granted to spouses. Third, the sperm donor was found 
to be a presumed parent under subdivision (d) since he received the child into his home and 
openly held out the child as his. 
 229. S.M., 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 4574, at *9, 14. 
 230. Id. at *19–20. 
 231. Id. at *14. 
 232. Id. at *8. 
 233. Id. at *8, 15–16. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at *8. 
 236. Id. at *7. 
 237. Id. at *8, 14–15. 
 238. Id. at *20. 
 239. Id. at *21. 
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provided sperm for artificial insemination without any intent to be 
the father of the resulting child.240 The court criticized S.M.’s lack of 
commitment, namely to his other son and that son’s mother, during 
his initial relationship with E.C.241 S.M. made no effort to assist 
during the pregnancy, and he was not present at the birth even 
though he was aware that the biological mother may have conceived 
as a result of their sexual relationship.242 Additionally, S.M. kept his 
relationship with the child a secret, choosing to preserve personal 
and employment relationships over acknowledging his child.243 
While affirming the trial court’s judgment, the Court of Appeal 
granted a limited remand to consider the amendment of section 7612 
on the issue of legal parentage.244 Even though the parties did not 
suggest that the child may have more than two legal parents,245 the 
court nonetheless determined that the matter was an appropriate case 
to determine whether finding only two parents would be detrimental 
to the child.246 In determining the appropriateness of the remand, the 
court considered the trial court’s “frustration in being limited to 
designating two parents for the child” and the “general directive in 
section 4 favoring retroactive application of changes in the Family 
Code.”247 Additionally, the court recognized that the Legislature had 
responded to the “many scholars [who] believe[d] that limiting a 
child to two parents [was] unfair in light of changing social views” 
and that it was the Legislature’s responsibility and not the courts’ to 
make policy determinations.248 
B.  In re Danny M. 
In In re Danny M., two men sought recognition as the child’s 
sole presumed father: David, the mother’s husband, with whom she 
 
 240. Id. at *20. 
 241. Id. at *15–17. 
 242. Id. at *15. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. *29. 
 245. Id. at *26–27. 
 246. Id. at *29. 
 247. Id. at *30. The court observed that “the general directive in section 4 favors retroactive 
application of changes in the Family Law Code, despite the general rule that favors prospective 
application of changes in the law.” Pursuant to section 4, subdivision (c), “[a] new law applies on 
the operative date to all matters governed by the new law, regardless of whether an event 
occurred or circumstance existed before, on, or after the operative date, including, but not limited 
to, commencement of a proceeding, making of an order, or taking an action.” Id. at *28–29. 
 248. Id. at *29–30. 
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had two children during their twenty year marriage; and Kelly, the 
biological father with whom she had a previous child prior to her 
marriage.249 During an eight-month separation from David, the 
mother rekindled a long-time relationship with Kelly and cohabited 
with him in hopes of producing another child.250 The mother and 
Kelly separated shortly thereafter, and David moved back into the 
family home. 
Nine months later, the mother gave birth to Kelly’s biological 
daughter, Danny. Six months after the birth, the mother and David 
informed Kelly and brought Danny to visit him.251 During a separate 
visit, Kelly cared for Danny, feeding, bathing, changing Danny’s 
diaper, and putting her to sleep.252 
In November 2012, eleven months after Danny was born, the 
family caught the attention of the Contra Costa County Children and 
Family Services Bureau because the children reportedly had chronic 
head lice and poor school attendance.253 After a brief investigation, 
the Bureau filed dependency petitions on behalf of the three 
children.254 The court found that both David and Kelly qualified as 
presumed fathers. David qualified as a presumed parent under 
section 7611, subdivisions (a) and (d) because he was married to the 
mother at the time of the Danny’s birth and held her out as his own 
natural daughter.255 Kelly was a Kelsey S. father since he 
immediately stepped forward once he learned about Danny and 
actively tried to play a substantial role in her life.256 
The facts of the dependency case suggested that David did not 
and would not provide a supportive parent-child relationship.257 
David failed to ensure the children attended school regularly, had 
ongoing problems with substance abuse, attempted suicide with 
prescription pills in the presence of his children, engaged in 
 
 249. In re Danny M., No. A138844 & A140256, 2014 Cal. App. LEXIS 3943, at *1, 3 (June 
3, 2014). 
 250. Id. at *3, 15. 
 251. Id. at *3, 11. 
 252. Id. at *12. 
 253. Id. at *3. 
 254. Id. at *7. 
 255. Id. at *29–30. The husband did not qualify as a presumed parent under section 7540, 
which requires cohabitation, since the child was conceived while the mother was still living with 
the biological father, rather than the husband. Id. at *26–27. 
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father’s home satisfied the requirements under section 7611(d). 
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controlling and harsh behavior with his wife and children, and on 
multiple occasions, physically attacked the mother.258 
Since California’s three-parent law was not enacted at the time, 
the juvenile court was required to choose one presumed father over 
the other, pursuant to section 7612, subdivision (b), on the “weightier 
considerations of policy and logic.”259 The court found that David’s 
relationship with the child was longer, but of questionable quality.260 
In contrast, Kelly’s relationship, “while comparatively brief, 
displayed none of the problems that had necessitated the child’s 
removal from the father’s custody.”261 The appellate court found that 
under the statutory scheme then in place, prior to the enactment of 
S.B. 274, the trial court made a reasonable choice and did not abuse 
its discretion on choosing Kelly as the sole presumed father.262 
 Had the law been in effect at the time, the court may have 
arrived at the same conclusion. Among other disturbing facts, the 
court found that on multiple occasions, David physically attacked the 
mother. Under Family Code section 3020, “the perpetration of child 
abuse or domestic violence in a household where a child resides is 
detrimental to the child.”263 To find that the child has more than two 
parents and recognize the parentage of the abusive father would 
contravene the detrimental standard of the three-parentage law. 
In sum, S.M. v. E.C. and In re Danny M. illustrate the court’s 
discretion to determine whether a child may have more than two 
parents. Particularly, In re Danny M. addresses the concerns 
regarding possible abuse of the three-parent law by demonstrating its 
limited application. Courts still require alleged parents to qualify 
under the UPA presumptions of parentage prior to determining 
whether the matter is an appropriate case to find that a child has 
more than two parents. Furthermore, although courts now have the 
authority to find more than two parents, they may apply the 7612 
analysis to find only one or two parents. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
If it takes a village to raise a child, why limit the number of 
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parents a child can have? M.C.’s tragic case demonstrates the 
inadequacies of California’s Family Code in light of the evolving 
family structure and proves that courts need more tools to protect the 
best interests of children. From M.C.’s perspective, it seems so 
resoundingly obvious that courts should recognize three parents in 
cases where a third parent intended to raise the child and in cases 
where a third parent has already established a relationship with the 
child. 
Arguably, granting courts the discretion to find that a child has 
more than two parents can open the doors to possible abuse. 
However, the California Legislature expressly intended that the law 
only applies in the rare case in which a child truly has more than two 
parents and recognizing more than two parents is necessary to protect 
the child from detriment. Moreover, the law advises courts to 
consider all relevant factors, including the harm of removing the 
child from a stable placement with a parent. 
A two-parent limit contravenes the rights of children that the 
Family Code seeks to protect and unfairly disregards the parental 
rights inherent in parent-child relationships. Most importantly, a two-
parent limit detrimentally harms the child by disregarding the 
emotional, psychological, and financial bonds inherent in a child-
parent relationship. Therefore, by recognizing that more than two 
parents can coexist in California’s proverbial village, California not 
only protect the rights and benefits of children like M.C., but also 
their emotional, psychological, and financial needs. 
 
 
